Abstract: Participatory sensing has been envisioned as a promising paradigm for rapidly sharing of environmental information by mobile smart phones that are always equipped with sensors. It invokes a large amount of mobile applications, e.g., participatory environmental monitoring, transportation and traffic management, and personal entertainments. As participators are usually volunteers, participatory sensing thus poses several fundamental security problems such as data trustworthiness, participator reputation evaluation, participator privacy protection and functional robustness against inner attacks or malicious participators. Although some schemes have already been proposed in recent years, none of them is able to solve above problems all together in one solution, especially, in a lightweight manner. In this paper, we make the first attempt for this regard and propose a scheme called LibTip. We pinpoint and model several new attacks in participatory sensing that are launched from inner attackers such as bad-mouth attack and key leakage attack. The definitions for the security of the scheme are formally stated. The security and performance are thoroughly analysed or proved, which justifies the applicability of LibTip.
Introduction
Mobile smart phones are largely used in personal daily life recently. It leads to a new computing paradigm called participatory sensing that consists of mobile sensing and information sharing, pervasively and ubiquitously. In participatory sensing, participators (usually volunteers for information gathering) report their sensing data on surroundings via their smart phones. Those reporting data are uploaded into central servers (e.g., cloud servers), and central servers share the data with users after data processing.
Recently, participatory sensing paradigm invokes a large amount of new applications, e.g., environmental monitoring, transportation management, and personal entertainments. For example, participators report real-time surrounding traffics for helping others avoid jamming in transportation systems; volunteers report parking vacancies for helping others shorten parking search time. Both applications can largely reduce automobile emissions. Also, participatory sensing has been also attracted more and more attentions in research communities (Lee and Hoh, 2010; Predic et al., 2013; Hachem et al., 2013; Gao et al., 2014; Liao et al., 2015; Caviglione et al., 2014) .
In participatory sensing, participators may be act as both data contributors and data consumers. For obtaining enough uploading sensing data and accumulating more sharing data, arbitrary volunteers may be encouraged to attend or enrolled into participatory sensing as data contributors. Thus, the data are possibly (or very likely) uploaded by arbitrary attenders who may be potential attackers or malicious contributors. In this situation, participatory sensing poses several key security problems:
1 The trustworthiness of uploading data should be evaluated. That is, as participators usually are enrolled from arbitrary volunteers who are willing to attend and contribute sensing data, the data contributed by them may be erroneous by mistakes, or malicious intentionally. Therefore, the uploading data should be evaluated at servers, as well as erroneous and malicious data should be detected and removed.
2 The privacy of data contributors should be protected. That is, the data uploading from participators (or data contributors) should not leak their personal privacy, such as location information, user trajectory, and location dynamics over time. Otherwise, data contributors will not attend participatory sensing. In this case, we do not distinguish malicious contributors and trustworthy contributors.
3 The robustness of overall defending system for solving above security problems should be guaranteed. That is, as participators could be arbitrary volunteers, who may be malicious or not, the security scheme thus should defend against those inner attackers. Especially, the privacy of contributors should be protected but the malicious contributors should be detected, traced, and ignored.
Unfortunately, current work (Groat et al., 2012; Boutsis and Kalogeraki, 2013; Huang et al., 2012 ) neither can solve above problems all together, nor can solve the problems in a lightweight manner (Wang and Ku, 2012; Christin et al., 2012) . Thus, we make the first attempt to achieve above three security objectives in one package, as well as in a lightweight manner. However, it poses three challenges:
1 Participators in participatory sensing are usually arbitrary volunteers, so it is not realistic or convenient to authenticate them in advance, e.g., upon their admission into the participatory sensing system. Moreover, those volunteers usually are not willing to be authenticated in advance for better friendly user experience or personal privacy. Thus data trustworthiness cannot be guaranteed by ordinary authentication in admission control.
2 To protect privacy, participator identification should be protected when they upload data. However, the user identification may be required for evaluating user reputation and for guaranteeing data trustworthiness.
3 As participator identification is protected and unknown to central servers, it becomes more difficult to defend against malicious participators (without identification).
In this paper, we propose a scheme to solve aforementioned security problems and tackle above challenges, in a lightweight and robust manner. We adapt a rigorous method to state, present, and analyse security goals. That is, we formulate the definition of data trustworthiness, participator privacy and scheme robustness in participatory sensing. Besides, the achievements of proposed scheme are formally proved. All those present for better clarity and rigorous generality. The contributions of the paper are listed as follows:
1 we make the first attempt to propose a lightweight and robust scheme to solve data trustworthiness, reputation evaluation, privacy protection, and scheme robustness against malicious participators in one solution 2 we make the first attempt to strictly define data trustworthiness, participator privacy, and scheme robustness in participatory sensing, and provide formal discussions on achieving security goals.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview on relevant prior work. In Section 3 we discuss the basic assumption and models used throughout the paper. Section 4 provides the detailed description of our proposed models and analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Related work
The security in participatory sensing starts to attract more and more attentions (Cristofaro and Soriente, 2013; Boutsis and Kalogeraki, 2013; Gao et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2012) . However, the current related work cannot solve security goals such as the data trustworthiness, reputation system, privacy protection and robustness for inner attackers (in participators) in one solution, and especially, in a lightweight manner. Boutsis and Kalogeraki (2013) proposed a scheme for privacy preserving in low overhead. Their scheme assumes that user data are generated and stored locally on individual smartphone devices, instead of maintained in a centralised database. This is a different assumption from ours. Groat et al. (2012) proposed privacy protection scheme for multidimensional data that uses negative surveys. They think multidimensional data are challenging for privacy protection and are common in participatory sensing applications. Their scheme focuses on a special type of data, but our scheme discusses all types of data. Kazemi and Shahabi (2011) proposed a privacy-aware framework called PiRi, which enables participation of the users without compromising their privacy. Wang and Ku (2012) proposed an anonymous sensory data collection approach designed particularly for mobile environments. They think most previously proposed methods are not designed for mobile environments and thus resource constraint has not been focused in solutions. Vu et al. (2012) proposed a mechanism based on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) to partition user locations into groups each containing at least K users. The mechanism preserves both locality and K-anonymity. Above works have only solved privacy protection problem, but not consider discussed other security requirements such as data trustworthiness, reputation, and especially robustness.
Regarding reputation requirement, Huang et al. (2012) proposed a reputation scheme that prevents the inadvertent leakage of privacy because of the inherent relationship for reputation. They consider there exists a dilemma: privacy is often achieved by removing the links between successive user contributions, but such links at the same time are essential for establishing trust. Our scheme poses the same dilemma, but we overcome the inherent difficulties in another way. Christin et al. (2012) proposed a framework called IncogniSense to utilise periodic pseudonyms generated using blind signature and relies on reputation transfer between these pseudonyms. Their work cannot achieve traitor tracing and requires extra operations such as reputation transferring. Trajectory privacy has been discussed in some papers. Gao et al. (2013) proposed a trajectory privacy-preserving framework, named TrPF, with lower information loss and costs. Their work focus on trajectory privacy instead of location privacy comparing with many previous works. Costa et al. (2011) proposed a framework for finding similar trajectories without disclosing the traces of participating users. Their scheme SmartTrace relies on an in-situ data storage model, where geo-location data is recorded locally on smartphones for both performance and privacy reasons. Our scheme also protects trajectory privacy, but we together address other extra security requirements.
Problem formulation

Network model
There exist three major entities in participatory sensing: contributors, central servers, and consumers. Contributors upload sensing data to central servers; central servers manage the uploading data, and prepare for presenting data to consumers; consumers fetch the presenting data from central servers. In this paper, we focus on the privacy of contributors instead of consumers, as the consumer privacy has already been addressed in many papers and can be solved by current existing solutions.
Contributors may be volunteers who install application softwares for participatory sensing in their smart phones freely. Thus, contributors should not be burdened for admission control processes in advance, e.g., registration. The real identification of contributors should be shielded for the protection of personal privacy such as locations, location dynamics over time, trajectory, and so on.
Central servers store the uploading data from contributors. The data may be cleaned, refined, and reorganised, and finally provided to consumers as presenting data.
Attack model and trust model
Channels between contributors and central servers are protected by other inherent security mechanisms (e.g., encryption and integrity protection) at link layers such as IEEE802.11i, GPRS, or CDMA, thus attacks at channels sniffing packets are out of the scope of this paper.
We concentrate adversaries at peers instead of at channels. As there exist three peers and in them consumers are not our concerns, we focus on contributors and central servers. The adversaries at contributor peers consist of two major types:
1 The contributors who upload forged data to misguide central servers. Thus, this kind of contributors should be detected and the forged data should be cleared, which are conducted at central servers.
2 The contributors may intensionally bypass or break the proposed defense scheme.
In summary, the proposed scheme should defend against the inner malicious contributors.
We assume the central servers may leak the contributor privacy such as location, trajectory, behaviours, and habits. Thus, the actual identification of contributors should be hidden to central servers. The trajectory and other dynamics over time should be concealed.
Design goals
The design goals has three folders as follows: confirm the trustworthiness of uploading data in presence of possible malicious contributors; protect contributor privacy without admission control, even for malicious contributors who can be traced back if needed; maintain the robustness of the proposed defending system to impede against those malicious contributors who are intentional to subvert the defending system.
Proposed scheme -LibTip
Data trustworthiness
Definition 4.1: Uploading data. They are the data sent from contributors to central servers for reporting surroundings. As participatory sensing may be an 'open' system, anyone who install the application (e.g., APP) at smart phones can contribute uploading data into central servers. The open system has no admission control for promoting more data uploading; it cannot distinguish trusted contributors and bad-mouth contributors before uploading by any prior information. Therefore, the data distinguishing has to stem from the observation on contributors at central servers after uploading by posterior information.
Definition 4.6: Central servers' observation. They are a serials of uploading data received by central servers and sent from contributors.
To distinguish trusted contributors and bad-mouth contributors, a reputation system has to be established at central servers. The central servers evaluate contributors' reputation according to their observation. Definition 4.7: Contributor reputation. It is a value to evaluate contributor's likelihood of being trusted contributor or bad-mouth contributor. The value is stored in a reputation system at central servers and calculated after central servers' observation.
Definition 4.8: Reputation system. It is a serials of calculating and managing methods to establish and evaluate contributor reputation of each contributor for distinguishing trusted contributors and bad-mouth contributors.
We can state a more general principle for clearing our motivations or necessary condition of the proposed scheme.
Proposition 1:
An open system in which there exists none any prior information (e.g., admission control information) must rely on a reputation system to distinguish between trusted ones and the others.
Proof: Sketch. Roughly speaking, as open system has no any prior information, trusted ones and the others cannot be distinguished at admission stage. Distinguishing thus has to come from the observations of their behaviours after admission. For distinguishing between trusted ones and the others, a distinguishing system will have to record the observation, evaluate the observation, and give the judgement for distinguishing, which finally form a reputation system for judgement.
To build a reputation system, 'good behaviour' and 'bad behaviour' should be judged upon each time of observation, so that the reputation system can evaluate the dynamics for behaviours, usually metrics for reputation evaluation. Before 'good behaviour' and 'bad behaviour' are defined, the judging criterion should be given at first. The judgement for 'good' and 'bad' are based on self-learning and information inferring. Next, we propose detail methods to deduce inferred actual surrounding data.
Suppose the uploading data at the similar locations (within δ 1 ) and similar time-stamps (within As policies are highly related to the types of uploading data, we leave it as an open context-aware module and propose five typical inferring policies for instance as follows:
Inf-Policy-I: Average.
)
,
where Avg() is a standard function computing the average value of input parameters D i . This policy may be used for all types of uploading data.
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Inf-Policy-II: Median. 
This policy is suitable for uploading data that are damping with distance, e.g., temperature or noise.
Proposition 2: Inf-Policy-III is sound.
Proof: Let k is damping rate over distance. Suppose x is inferred value at L. We have , . 
This policy is suitable for uploading data that are damping with time, e.g., volumes of traffics or crowds.
Proposition 3: Inf-Policy-IV is sound.
Proof:
The proof is similar to Proposition 2. Omitted. which is the reputation of inferred actual surrounding data (we will state how to create the reputation system later). We recommend the policy Inf-Policy-V in our proposed scheme LibTip.
Inf-Policy
Next, we define 'good uploading' and 'bad uploading' behaviours.
Definition 4.10: Good (bad) uploading. The reputation system in central servers judges the uploading data is good, if and only if the distinction between uploading data and inferred actual surrounding data is within a threshold value. The reputation system calls this time of uploading from a contributor is 'good uploading'. Otherwise, the reputation system calls this time of uploading is 'bad uploading'.
We next propose a typical judging policy for 'good uploading' and 'bad uploading' as follows: 
Reputation evaluation
Suppose current contributor reputation is R. To evaluate contributor reputation dynamics, we propose following evaluation policies:
Eva-Policy-I: Threshold bias linear adjustment.
Threshold Judgement is used. If the bad uploading occurs, R ⇐ R − 1. Otherwise, R ⇐ R + 1.
Eva-Policy-II: Exponential bias linear adjustment.
Suppose the uploaded data is U, and the inferred actual surrounding data is D. Compute Bia = |U − D|/D. Suppose threshold value is Th.
If Bia > Th and |Bia
Eva-Policy-III: Exponential bias exponential adjustment.
Suppose the uploading data is U, and the inferred actual surrounding data is D.
Definition 4.13: Presenting data. They are the data presenting to consumers at central servers.
Definition 4.14: Data trustworthiness of presenting data. It is a value to evaluate the bias between the presenting data (denoted as P) presenting for consumers and actual surrounding data (denoted as A). It can be defined as |P − A|/A. Hereby actual surrounding data is estimated by inferred actual surrounding data at central servers, namely,
The reputation system is not only used for deducing inferred actual surrounding data so as to compute data trustworthiness of uploading data, but also is used for creating presenting data and computing data trustworthiness of the presenting data. It poses two situations:
Situation-I: Inferred surrounding data are available.
Suppose the uploading data of the contributor is U, and the reputation of the contributor is r. Suppose D is the inferred actual surrounding data computing from the contributors within similar locations and similar timestamps, and R is the reputation of D.
The presenting data are P ⇐ FunP(U, D, r, R), where FunP() is a function taking as input U, D, r, R and output presenting data, denoted as P. The trustworthiness of this data is T ⇐ FunT(r, R), where FunT() is a function taking as input r, R and output the data trustworthiness of the presenting data, denoted as T.
Situation-II: Inferred surrounding data are unavailable.
The presenting data have to be U, as inferred surrounding data are unavailable. The data trustworthiness providing to customers is calculated by r/R max , where R max is the current maximal reputation value in reputation system. Or, the data trustworthiness is Λ to denote inferred surrounding data are unavailable.
Contributor privacy protection
Definition 4.15: Contributor actual identification. It is the essential identification of a contributor for uniquely distinguishing, e.g., student id, drive licence id, social security number, and so on. We propose to use contributor anonymous identity instead of contributor actual identity in participatory sensing to protect contributor privacy.
Definition 4.18: Contributor anonymous identity. It is a unique identity to distinguish each contributor in the reputation system.
The procedures for contributor privacy protection consist of following steps:
• PP-Step1: Initial key preparation.
When a contributor sends uploading data at the first time, its contributor reputation is set as an initial value r0. It belongs to a initial group with the group identity gid = gid0, and has an initial group authentication key gak = gak0. The gid and gak are both deployed previously with application software on smart phones.
• PP-Step2) Contributors generate contributor anonymous identity.
Contributor anonymous identity is randomly generated with a fixed length, when each contributor sends uploading data to central servers.
• PP-Step3: Contributors upload data to central servers.
The uploading data from a contributor to central servers has six tuples , , , , (
where cai is the contributor anonymous identity; l is the location identity of uploading data; t is the time-stamp of uploading data; d is data for surroundings; h(˙) is an one-way and collision-free function.
• PP-Step4: Central servers verify the validity of contributors.
Central servers search gak by gid, and verify whether h(gak_cai) is correct or not. If it is correct, central servers deem the contributor possesses the group gid, so as to have corresponding reputation value of that group.
• PP-Step5: Central servers update reputation.
Reputation system in central servers stores contributor reputation of each contributor, and updates reputation values for contributors via aforementioned reputation evaluation policies. That is, each contributor has a corresponding contributor reputation value that are computed and maintained by reputation system.
• PP-Step6: Central servers update gak and gid.
Reputation system maintains an updating period. It is a period set up by central servers for updating all group authentication keys and group identities. For example, suppose the updating period is 24 hours. The updating time of group authentication keys and group identities is at 12:00 PM each day.
Suppose at the end of the updating period, each contributor has a reputation value, denoted by r. All current contributors are grouped by their reputation value. The group authentication key and group identity are both randomly generated by central servers. Central servers store < gid, gak, r >, and send new gid and gak to corresponding contributors confidentially.
• PP-Step7: Contributors update gak and gid.
The contributors in the same group receive the same group authentication key (gak) and group identity (gid). The contributor replaces the old gid with the new one, and replaces old gak with the new one.
Robustness enhancement
Firstly, we analyse the potential attacks in our proposed scheme for data trustworthiness and contributor privacy protection. In previous section, we point out the adversaries in contributor peers are bad-mouth contributors; next we point out another possible malicious one in current context. Definition 4.19: Traitor contributors. They are the contributors who leak group authentication key to other contributors, so that other contributors can obtain profit, e.g., easily obtain higher reputation value.
Definition 4.20: Key leakage attack. Traitor contributors leak the group authentication key to other contributors, so that other contributors can obtain corresponding reputation directly to avoid any reputation evaluation procedure.
To further enhance the robustness of the scheme, we propose following two methods.
• ROB-M1: Counting group members.
At the end of each updating period, central servers record the count of the group members. In the next period, when one member with different contributor anonymous identity joins the group, central servers will decrease the count. Once the count is zero, new comers who ask to join the group are unpermitted. This method can limit the influence of the leakage of group authentication key, and detect the key leakage attack.
• ROB-M2: Traitor tracing.
It is appropriate that central servers can trace the traitor who exposes the authentication group key to other contributors. The naive method is to change the group authentication key. For example, it can be achieved by making the group authentication key consist of two parts: one is the group authentication key generated by central servers; the other is the private key generated by contributors. The traitor trace from the distinguished group authentication key is enabled. However, this method will leak the contributor privacy due to the private key. Therefore, we propose to use modified group signature to achieve both traitor tracing and contributor privacy protection.
Next, we introduce group signature at first, and then we propose a method basing on the group signature later.
The group signature scheme generally has four algorithms (Bellare et al., 2003) : group key generation, group signing, group signature verification, and open algorithm (to determine the identity of signer).
A group signature scheme GS = (GKg, GSig, GVf, Open) consists of four polynomial-time algorithms (Bellare et al., 2003) :
1 The randomised group key generation algorithm GKg takes input 1 k , 1 n , where k ∈ N is the security parameter and n ∈ N is the group size (for example, the number of members of the group), and returns a tuple (gpk, gmsk, gsk) , where gpk is the group public key, gmsk is the group manager's secret key, and gsk is an n-vector of keys with gsk[i] being a secret signing key for player i ∈ [n]. 3 The deterministic group signature verification algorithm GVf takes as input the group public key gpk, a message m, and a candidate signature σ for m to return either 1 or 0.
4 The deterministic opening algorithm Open takes as input the group manager secret key gmsk, a message m, and a signature σ of m to return an identity i or the symbol to indicate failure.
After the preliminary of group signature is given, we propose the following procedures that enhance the previous privacy protection scheme by group signature:
• EPP-Step1: Initial key preparation. It is the same as PP-Step1.
• EPP-Step2: Contributors and central servers previously negotiate a trusted third party (TTP) who will be the key generator and traitor judger when traitor contributor needs to be traced.
• EPP-Step3: Contributors generate contributor anonymous identity. It is the same as PP-Step2.
• EPP-Step4: The TTP generates group keys for each group that has the same reputation value. That is, the keys (gpk, gmsk, gsk) are generated at TTP for a group.
• EPP-Step5: The TTP distributes gsk[i] to corresponding group members for each group, distributes gpk to central severs, and holds gmsk.
• EPP-Step6: Contributors upload data to central servers. where cai is the contributor anonymous identity; l is the location identity of uploading data; t is the time-stamp of uploading data; d is data for surroundings; h(˙) is a one-way and collision-free function. 2 For contributors who are not coming the first time.
The group authentication key is gak ⇐ gsk [i] for each group member in a group. The uploading data from contributors to central servers has six tuples , , , ,
where cai is the contributor anonymous identity; l is the location identity of uploading data; t is the time-stamp of uploading data; d is data for surroundings; GSig(·, ·) is a group signature signing function taking as input gsk [i] and cai.
• EPP-Step7: Central servers update reputation. It is the same with PP-Step5.
• EPP-Step8: Central servers update gid, and TTP updates (gpk, gmsk, gsk) .
Suppose at the end of the updating period, each contributor has a reputation value, denoted by r. All current contributors are grouped by their reputation value. The group identity is randomly generated by central servers. Central servers receive gpk from TTP. Central servers store < gid, gpk, r >, and send gid to corresponding contributors confidentially.
• EPP-Step9: Contributors update gak = gsk [i] and gid.
Contributors in the same group receive a group authentication key (gak = gsk [i] ) from TTP and a group identity (gid) from central servers. Contributors replace the old gid with the new one, and replace old gak with the new one.
The leakage of group authentication keys can be traced back at TTP to the key gsk [i] that is exposed, so that the contributor who leaks the group authentication key can be traced.
The components in the scheme LibTip is listed in Table 1 . Table 1 Components 
Analysis
Proposition 4: Contributor anonymous identity is necessary in the solution.
Proof: Contributor anonymous identities are generated to conceal contributor actual identities. Besides, contributor anonymous identities are identities for reputation evaluation in reputation system. That is, the reputation computation is dedicated to a representative identity (contributor anonymous identity) during an updating period.
Proposition 5: Group authentication key is necessary in the solution.
Proof: Group authentication key is used to anonymously authenticate contributors for their current reputation value, thus the reputation value can be continually evaluated and updated in the reputation system for a contributor.
Proposition 6: Group identity is necessary in the solution.
Proof: Group identity is used to sort the group authentication key at central servers. As group identity is randomly generated and updated periodically, adversaries at channels cannot trace groups as well as group members after link layer encryption.
Proposition 7: LibTip is a lightweight solution.
Proof:
In LibTip scheme, extra inducing items in < cai, l, t, d, h(gak_cai), gid >, < cai, l, t, d, GSig(gsk[i] Proposition 8: The contributor perfect privacy is guaranteed (namely, Pri = 0).
Proof: Central servers can only view contributor anonymous identities, thus contributor actual identities are unknown to central servers. Besides, contributor anonymous identities are generated randomly, thus linkage between contributor actual identities and contributor anonymous identities, and linkage between contributor anonymous identities are broken. That is, Pri = Pr{Id ⇐ CS|CS ← d} = Pr{Id|cai} = 0.
Proposition 9:
The risk on the exposure of a contributor's trajectory within an updating period is f(min(|G|), max(e)), where |G| is the group size, and e is the number of uploading times of this contributor in the group in this period.
Proof: In one period, contributor anonymous identity is unchanged, thus the trajectory can be traced for one contributor. The risk on the exposure of a contributor's trajectory is related to two elements as follows: If the number of uploading times is larger, the trajectory contains more information such as locations and timestamps. If the number of group member is smaller, the risks for trajectory exposure of a contributor's anonymous identity is larger. Thus, the risk is a function of min(|G|) and max(e). However, as the contributor actual identity is unknown, the trajectory cannot link to any actual identity.
Proposition 10: Key leakage attack can be defended against by counting group members and traitor tracing.
Proof: The number of group members is counted. Thus, the leakage of group authentication key can be detected, when the number of contributors who attempt to join the group is more than the count. Once the detection is alert, central servers can ask TTP to trace back the group member who leaks the group authentication key by presenting the messages (namely, cai) and signatures (namely, GSig(gsk[i] , cai)). TTP can reveal the identity (namely, the i of gsk [i] ) who sign the signature by its Open function.
Proposition 11: Attackers at channels can be defended against.
Proof: As the confidentiality of packets between contributors and central servers is assumed to be guaranteed, the attackers at channels between contributors and central servers cannot break the contributor privacy by observing the uploading data.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight scheme LibTip to guarantee data trustworthiness, reputation evaluation, contributor privacy protection, and robustness against inner attackers in participatory sensing. LibTip provides an integral solution package consisting of a bunch of methods, policies and procedures. The security of LibTip in terms of data trustworthiness, privacy protection and robustness was strictly proved. The necessity of scheme components is also analysed, which justified the lightweight property of LibTip.
